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Abstract: In this research, Description Logics (DLs) will be employed for logical description, logical characterisation, 
logical modelling and ontological description of concept understanding in terminological systems. It’s 
strongly believed that using a formal descriptive logic could support us in revealing logical assumptions 
whose discovery may lead us to a better understanding of ‘concept understanding’. The Structure of 
Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO) model as an appropriate model of increasing complexity of humans’ 
understanding has supported the formal analysis. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The central focus of this research is on concepts. My 
point of departure is the special focus on the fact that 
there is a general problem concerning the notion of 
‘concept’, in linguistics, psychology, philosophy and 
computer science. This research aims at providing a 
logical description (and analysis) of the use of 
‘concepts’ in terminological knowledge 
representation systems, and, thus, I need to assume 
concepts’ applications in order to be comprehensible 
in the context and in my logical formalism. Taking 
into consideration (Baader et al., 2010) and 
(Rudolph, 2011), a concept might be correlated with 
a distinct ‘entity’ or to/with its essential features, 
characteristics and properties. Note that an entity’s 
properties express its relationships with itself and 
with other entities. Through the lens of Predicate 
Logic, a concept might be considered to be 
equivalent to a [unary] predicate. It shall be 
emphasised that this remark is not about language, 
but this is how concepts are perceived by logicians. 
Accordingly, it could be claimed that predicates 
could—logically—express the characteristics of 
concepts in terminological systems. More 
specifically, predicates assign characteristics, 
features and properties of concepts into some 
subjects. It’s believed that predicates may determine 
the applications of logical descriptions. As all 
logicians know, predicates play fundamental roles in 
reasoning processes and in giving satisfying 
conditions for definitions of [logical] truth. By 
taking into consideration that ‘a predicate expresses 
a condition that the entities referred to may satisfy, 
in which case the resulting sentence will be true (see 
(Blackburn, 2016))’, predicates can be applied in 
expressing meanings within formal semantics. 
Subsequently, the formal semantics could focus on 
multiple conditions through definitions of truth (and 
falsity). The central objective of formal semantics 
can be said to be formalising and manipulating the 
relationships between the signifiers of a description 
and what the signifiers do [or have been designed to 
do], see (Jackendoff, 1990; Gray et al., 1992; 
Barsalou, 1999; Resnik, 1999). 
As mentioned, the central focus of this research 
is on concepts (and through the lens of Predicate 
Logic). Concepts and their interrelationships will be 
used to establish the basic terminology adopted in 
the modelled domain regarding the hierarchical 
structures. My logical descriptions will have a 
special focus on my methodological assumption that 
expresses that ‘human beings can find out that an 
individual thing/phenomenon is an instance of a 
formed concept, and, thus, their individual grasp of 
that concept (in the form of their conceptions) 
provide foundations for producing their own 
conceptualisations’. This article will focus on 
describing and characterising humans’ concept 
understandings and will deal with a formal-semantic 
model for figuring out the underlying logical 
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assumptions of ‘concept understanding’. The term 
‘understanding’ will be observed from multiple 
perspectives, and, subsequently, the expressiveness 
of the semantic model’s descriptions will be 
improved. The Structure of Observed Learning 
Outcomes (SOLO) taxonomy is an appropriate 
model of increasing complexity of humans’ 
understanding. SOLO as a descriptive model of 
knowing and understanding can support my 
formalism. Additionally, its taxonomical structure 
could be expressed in the form of some logical 
inclusions. In this research, the formal semantic 
analysis of [concept] understanding is based on 
Description Logics (DLs). I believe that DLs can 
support me in proposing an understandable logical 
description for clarifying concept understanding. 
DLs as the profound formalism are used for 
representing predicates and for formal reasoning 
over them. They mainly focus on terminological 
knowledge. It is of a terminological system’s 
particular importance in providing a logical 
formalism for knowledge representation systems, 
and, also, for semantic representations and 
ontologies (as formal and explicit specification of a 
shared conceptualisation on the domains of interest), 
see (Davies et al., 2003; Staab and Studer, 2009). 
The main contributions of this research are: (i) 
providing a formal semantics (relying on DLs) for 
conceptual analysis of concept understanding, and 
analysing a knowledge representation formalism for 
expressing concept understanding, and (ii) designing 
and formalising an ontology that provides a 
structural representation of concept understanding 
within the analysed semantic model. 
2 DESCRIPTION LOGICS 
First, I shall mention that (Baader et al., 2010) is my 
main reference to Description Logics. Description 
Logics (DLs) represent knowledge in terms of 
individuals (objects, things), concepts (classes of 
things), and roles (relationships between things). 
Individuals correspond to constant symbols, 
concepts to unary predicates, and roles to binary (or 
any other n-ary) predicates and relations in Predicate 
Logic. Reconsidering the predicate P in Predicate 
Logic, we have [possibly specified] concept C in 
DLs. There are two kinds of atomic symbols, which 
are called atomic concepts and atomic roles. These 
symbols are the elementary descriptions from which 
we can inductively (by employing concept 
constructors and role constructors) build the 
specified descriptions. Considering NC, NR and NO as 
the sets of atomic concepts, atomic roles and 
individuals respectively, the ordered triple NC, NR, 
NO  represents a signature. The set of main logical 
symbols in ALC (Attributive Language with 
Complements: the Prototypical DL, see (Schmidt-
Schauss and Smolka, 1991)) is: { Conjunction (⊓: 
And), Disjunction (⊔: Or), Negation (¬: Not), 
Existential Restriction (∃: There exists ... ), 
Universal Restriction (∀: For all ... ) }. We also 
have Atomic Concepts (A), Top Concept (⊤: 
Everything) and Bottom Concept (⊥: Nothing) in 
ALC.  
In order to define a formal semantics, we need to 
apply terminological interpretations over our 
signatures. More particularly, any [terminological] 
interpretation consists of (i) a non-empty set ∆ (that 
is the interpretation domain and consists of any 
variable that occurs in any of the concept 
descriptions), and (ii) an interpretation function .I 
(let me call it ‘interpreter’). The interpreter assigns 
to every individual (like a) a ‘aI ∈ ∆I’. Also, it 
assigns to every atomic concept A (or every atomic 
unary predicate) a set A I ⊆ ∆I , and to every atomic 
role P (or every atomic binary predicate) a binary 
relation PI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I. Table 1 reports the syntax 
and the semantics of ALC.  
Table 1: The Prototypical Description Logic. 
Syntax Semantics 
A AI ⊆ ∆I 
P PI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I 
⊤ ∆I 
⊥ ∅ 
C ⊓ D (C ⊓ D)I  = CI ∩ DI 
C ⊔ D (C ⊔ D)I  = CI ∪ DI 
¬C (¬C)I  = ∆I  \ CI 
∃R. C { a | ∃b.(a,b) ∈ RI ∧ b ∈ CI } 
∀R. C { a | ∀b.(a,b) ∈ RI ⊃ b ∈ CI } 
A knowledge base in DLs usually consists of a 
number of terminological axioms and world 
descriptions (so-called: ‘assertions’), see Table 2. 
The terminological interpretation I is called a model 
of an axiom [or a model of a basic world 
description], if, and only if, it can semantically 
satisfy it, see Tables 2 and 3. In the following Tables 
P is an atomic role, R and S are role descriptions, A 
is an atomic concept, and C and D are concept 
descriptions. 
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Table 2: Axioms and World Descriptions in DLs. 
Name Syntax Semantics 
Concept Inclusion Axiom C ⊑ D CI ⊆ DI  
Role Inclusion Axiom R ⊑ S  RI ⊆ SI 
Concept Equality Axiom C ≡ D  CI = DI 
Role Equality Axiom R ≡ S  RI = SI 
Concept Assertion C(a)  aI ∈ CI 
Role Assertion R(a, b)  (aI, bI) ∈ RI  
Table 3: Inductive Concept Descriptions. 
Over Concept Over Role 
AI ⊆ ∆I PI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I 
⊥I = ∅ ⊥I = ∅ 
(¬C)I = ∆I  \ CI (¬R)I = (∆I × ∆I) \ RI 
(C ⊓ D)I = CI ∩ DI (R ⊓ S)I = RI ∩ SI 
Let me start the logical analysis with two examples: 
Example 1. Mary has verified that ‘there is a young 
student’ and ‘there is a non-old student’ are 
expressing the same matter. Her verification 
between these two propositions is expressible in DLs 
by: ∃hasStudent.Young ≡ ∃hasStudent.¬Old.	 It’s 
realisable that Mary has assumed the axiom stating 
that Young and Old are two disjoint concepts, and, in 
fact, the logical term ‘Young ⊓ Old ⊑ ⊥’ has formed 
a terminological axiom for Mary. It’s obvious that 
Mary’s interpretation over (i) Young ⊓ Old ⊑ ⊥ 
(meaning that Young and Old are disjoint concepts) 
and (ii) Person ⊑ Young ⊔ Old (meaning that every 
person is either young or old) has played crucial 
roles here. In fact, Mary has interpreted, and, 
respectively, understood that these two sentences 
(‘there is a young student’ and ‘there is a non-old 
student’) have the same meanings. More 
specifically, Mary’s terminological interpretation 
(over i and ii) has produced her understanding of an 
equivalence between the concept descriptions 
∃hasStudent.Young and ∃hasStudent.¬Old. We 
can see that Mary’s interpretation has been restricted 
(limited) to her understanding of disjointness of the 
concept descriptions ∃hasStudent.Young and 
∃hasStudent.¬Old. At this point I shall claim that 
the concepts (concept descriptions) C and D are 
logically and semantically equivalent, when ‘for all’ 
possible terminological interpretations like I, we 
have: CI = DI . In this example, if one person, say 
John, does not assume the axioms stating that 
‘Young and	 Old are two disjoint concepts’ and 
‘every person is either young or old’, then there will 
not be an equivalence relation between 
∃hasStudent.Young and ∃hasStudent.¬Old. Let me 
conclude that Mary’s and John’s understandings are 
dissimilar, because they have had different 
terminological interpretations in their minds (and it 
is because of their different conceptions and concept 
formations). For example, regarding John’s 
terminological interpretation, the proposition ‘there 
is a middle-aged student’ could be added beside 
‘there is a young student’ and ‘there is a non-old 
student’. In fact, John could have the axiom ‘Person 
⊑ Young ⊔ MiddleAged ⊔ Old (meaning that every 
person is young or middle aged or old)’ in his mind. 
Consequently, John by taking this axiom (based on 
his own conception) into consideration doesn’t 
understand ‘∃hasStudent.Young’ and 
‘∃hasStudent.¬Old’ as equivalent concept 
descriptions.  
Example 2. Mary has verified that ‘Anna has a child 
who is a philosopher’ and ‘Anna has a child who is a 
painter’ could be jointly expressed by ‘Anna has a 
child who is a philosopher and painter’. Translated 
into DLs we have her expression as followings:  
∃hasChild.Philosopher ⊓ ∃hasChild.Painter ≡ 
∃hasChild.(Philosopher ⊓ Painter). Suppose that 
Anna has two children and one is a philosopher and 
the other one is a painter. Then, 
∃hasChild.(Philosopher ⊓ Painter) is not equivalent 
to ∃hasChild.Philosopher ⊓ ∃hasChild.Painter.	
Actually, Mary has not proposed a correct 
description, and this is because of her inappropriate 
terminological interpretation. Accordingly, her 
understanding has followed her inappropriate 
interpretation. In fact, she incorrectly (semantically: 
False) has understood that the proposition ‘Anna has 
a child who is a philosopher and painter’ expresses 
the same matter. Reconsidering the proposed 
formalism, ∃hasChild.Philosopher ⊓ 
∃hasChild.Painter and ∃hasChild.(Philosopher ⊓ 
Painter)  are not—semantically—the same and there 
should not be an equivalence symbol between them. 
Thus, Mary’s interpretation has not been 
satisfactory. Subsequently, her understanding is not 
satisfactory and appropriate.  
3 A SEMANTIC MODEL FOR 
CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING  
In this section I clarify my logical conceptions of 
‘concept understanding’. The term ‘understanding’ 
is very complicated and sensitive in psychology, 
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neuroscience, cognitive science, philosophy and 
epistemology. There has not been any complete 
model for describing this term, but there are some 
proper models of (i) understanding of understanding 
(see (Foerster, 2003)), (ii) understanding 
representation (see (Peschl and Riegler, 1999; 
Webb, 2009)), and (iii) specification of the 
components of understanding (i.e., from the 
cognition’s and from the affects’ perspectives), see 
(Chaitin, 1987; Kintsch et al., 1990; di Pellegrino et 
al., 1992; MacKay, 2003; Zwaan and Taylor, 2006; 
Uithol et al., 2011; Uithol and Paulus, 2014). This 
research—by analysing a formal semantics—focuses 
on the junctions of ‘understanding of concept 
understanding’ and ‘concept understanding 
representation’ in terminological systems, and, more 
specifically, it focuses on logical analysis of concept 
understanding and its terminological representation. 
3.1 Concept Understanding as a 
Relation (and Function) 
I shall claim that concept understanding—as a 
relation—could relate ‘the characteristics and 
attributes of a concept’ with ‘a description’. More 
specifically, understanding is a function (mapping) 
from a concept into some propositions (and 
statements) which could be interpreted as ‘concept 
descriptions’. In fact, the characteristics and 
properties of a concept by means of the 
understanding function become mapped into 
concept descriptions. Let me be more specific:  
A. A human being—by concept understanding—
attempts to map the significant characteristics of 
concepts into some concept descriptions. For 
example, ‘breathing’—as a biological and 
psychological process—is a characteristic and trait 
of all animals, and, thus, breathing (that is a role) is 
the characteristic of the concept Animal. Then, (i) 
knowing the fact that the individual horse is an 
instance of the concept Animal (Formally: 
Animal(horse)), and (ii) drawing the [concept 
subsumption] inference ‘Horse ⊑ Animal’, 
collectively lead us to knowing and to understanding 
that ‘horses breathe’ (or equivalently: ‘horses do 
breathing’). The role breathing could be manifested 
in the concept Breath. Therefore, (i) and (ii) 
collectively lead us to expressing the concept 
description ‘Animal(horse) ⊓ ∃hasTrait.Breath’ for 
the individual horse (as an instance of the concept 
Animal), and, respectively, for the concept Horse (as 
a sub-concept of Animal). 
 
B. A human being—by concept understanding—
attempts to map the concepts’ properties and their 
interrelationships with themselves into some concept 
descriptions. For example, the one who knows that 
‘male horses breathe’, by taking the terminological 
and assertional axioms {Animal(horse), Horse ⊑ 
Animal, MaleHorse ⊑ Horse, FemaleHorse ⊑ Horse} 
into consideration can know and understand that 
‘female horses breathe’ as well.  
 
C. A human being—by concept understanding—
attempts to map the concepts’ properties and their 
relationships with other concepts into some concept 
descriptions. For example, the one who knows that 
‘horses breathe’ (and as described: Animal(horse) ⊓ 
∃hasTrait.Breath), could—respectively—know and 
understand that the individual rabbit (that is an 
animal) breathes as well. So, she/he could express 
that ‘rabbits breathe’, and, in fact, Animal(rabbit) ⊓ 
∃hasTrait.Breath. 
 
Conclusion. Relying on Predicate Logic [and on 
DLs], the phenomenon of ‘concept understanding’ 
could be interpreted as a ‘binary predicate’ [and as a 
‘role’] of human beings on expressing some concept 
descriptions. Let me represent this role by 
‘understanding’.  
3.2 Concept Understanding as a 
Conceptualisation 
The concept understanding could be interpreted to 
be the limit/type of conceptualisation. Accordingly, 
humans need to conceptualise concepts in order to 
understand them. In (Badie, 2016a) and (Badie, 
2016b), I have defined a ‘conceptualisation’ as “a 
uniform specification of the separated 
understandings”. In fact, any concept understanding 
could be interpreted as a local manifestation of a 
global conceptualisation. Additionally, human 
beings’ grasps of concepts could provide proper 
foundations for generating their own 
conceptualisations. I shall claim that ‘concept 
understanding’ could be acknowledged as a limited 
type of humans’ concept constructions, when the 
concept constructions are supported by their own 
conceptualisations. Therefore, conceptualising is a 
role of human beings. This conclusion—relying on 
DLs—could be represented by the ‘role inclusion (or 
role subsumption)’ understanding ⊑ conceptualising. 
In other words, ‘understanding a concept’ has been 
acknowledged as the sub-role of ‘conceptualising 
that concept’. On the other hand, it is not the case 
that all conceptualisations are understandings. In 
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fact, all the conceptualised concepts could not be 
understood.  
3.3 Concept Understanding as an 
Interpretation-based Model 
Generally, an interpretation is the act of elucidation, 
explication and explanation, see (Simpson and 
Weiner, 1989). According to (Honderich, 2005) and 
through the lens of philosophy, “…in existential and 
hermeneutic philosophy, ‘interpretation’ becomes 
the most essential moment of human life: The 
human being is characterized by having an 
‘understanding’ of itself, the world, and others. This 
understanding, to be sure, does not consist—as in 
classical ontology or epistemology—in universal 
features of universe or mind, but in subjective–
relative and historically situated interpretations of 
the social. …”. Regarding (Blackburn, 2016) and 
through the lens of logic, an ‘interpretation’ of a 
logical system assigns meanings (or semantic 
values) to the formulae and their elements. At this 
point I shall take into consideration that the 
phenomenon of ‘interpretation’ could have a 
conjunction with the phenomenon of ‘terminological 
interpretation’ in formal languages. More 
specifically, the one who has engaged her/his 
interpretations to explicate [and justify] what [and 
why] she/he means by classifying a 
thing/phenomenon as an instance of a concept, needs 
to interpret the non-logical signifiers of different 
concept descriptions within her/his linguistic 
expressions.  
Considering any set of non-logical symbols (that 
have no logical consequences) in a terminology, a 
terminological interpretation over humans’ 
languages could be described to be constructed 
based on the tuple Interpretation Domain, 
Interpretation Function . The interpretation domain 
(or the universe of interpretation) might be called 
‘universe of discourse’. As mentioned in previous 
section, the interpretation domain must be non-
empty. This non-empty set forms the range of any 
variable that occur in any of the concept descriptions 
within linguistic expressions. It’s a fact that the 
collection of the rules and the processes that manage 
different terms and descriptions in linguistic 
expressions, cannot have any meaning until the non-
logical signifiers and constructors are given 
terminological interpretations. The interpretations 
prepare humans for producing their personal 
meaningful [and understandable] concept 
descriptions. Hence, I have recognised all ‘concept 
understandings’ as ‘concept interpretations’. This 
conclusion—relying on DLs—could be represented 
by the ‘role inclusion’ understanding ⊑ interpreting. 
Therefore, ‘concept understanding’ has been 
expressed as the sub-role of ‘concept interpreting’. 
But, on the other hand, not all interpretations (of 
concepts) imply understandings (of concepts). 
Equivalently, it is not the case that all 
interpretations are understandings. In other words, 
all the interpreted concepts may not be understood. 
Accordingly, considering any interpretation as a 
function, ‘concept understanding’ is recognised as 
an ‘interpretation function’. 
From this point I apply the function UND (as a 
limit of the interpretation function I) in my 
formalism. Then, CUND represents ‘Concept 
Understanding’, where C stands  for Concept. 
Consequently, considering UND as a kind of 
interpretation, there exists a tuple like DU, 
Cunderstood , where (i) DU represents the understanding 
domain (that consists of the variables that occur in 
any of the concept descriptions which are going to 
be understood), and (ii) Cunderstood is the understood 
concept. Cunderstood is achievable based on the 
understanding function –UND. Relying on the 
function –UND,  
 
CUND ⊆ CI ⊆ ∆I  & 
DUUND
 ⊆ ∆I. 
 
It shall be stressed that DUUND expresses 
‘understanding all concepts belonging to the 
understanding domain’. Note that –UND (that is a 
function) can provide a model for a terminological 
[and assertional] axiom. Therefore, the desired 
model (i) is a restricted form of a terminological-
interpretation-based model, and (ii) can satisfy the 
semantics of the terminological and assertional 
axioms (read ‘UND ⊨ Axiom’: UND satisfies the 
axiom), see Table 4. Consequently:   
 
CUND ⊆ CI  ⊆ ∆I       &        -UND : C → CUND                   
Where:  CUND ⊆  DUUND
  ⊆ ∆I .  
 
I shall emphasise that we are not able to conclude 
that CI ⊆  DUUND
 . On the other hand, we certainly 
know that ,  CUND ⊆ ∆I (because CUND ⊆ CI  and CI  
⊆ ∆I). According to the analysed characteristics, the 
UND understanding model in my terminology is 
constructed based upon the tuple Understanding 
Domain, Understanding Function  as: 
  
UND = DUUND, -UND . 
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Table 4: Understanding Model: Terminologies, World 
Descriptions and their Semantics. 
Name Description, Semantics 
Understanding a        
Concept Inclusion 
UND ⊨ (C ⊑D)  ⇒        
CUND ⊆ DUND 
Understanding a        
Role Inclusion 
UND ⊨ (R ⊑S)  ⇒         
RUND ⊆ SUND 
Understanding a        
Concept Equality 
UND ⊨ (C ≡D)  ⇒        
CUND = DUND  
Understanding  a       
Role Equality 
UND ⊨ (R ≡S)  ⇒        
RUND = SUND  
Understanding a        
Concept Assertion 
UND ⊨ C(a)  ⇒          
aUND ∈ CUND 
Understanding a        
Role Assertion 
UND ⊨ R(a, b) ⇒          
(aUND, bUND) ∈ RUND 
Table 5 is based on Table 4 and itemises inductive 
concept descriptions and their semantics as the 
products of the understanding model. 
Table 5: Understanding Inductive Concept Descriptions. 
Model Satisfies the 
Vocabulary 
Semantics 
UND ⊨ ⊤ ⊤UND= ⊤ 
UND ⊨ ⊥ ⊥UND =  ∅ 
UND ⊨ ¬R  (¬R)UND = ⊤ \ RUND 
UND ⊨ ¬C  (¬C )UND  = DUUND  \ CUND   
UND ⊨ (R ⊓ S)  (R ⊓ S) UND  = RUND ∩ SUND  
UND ⊨ (C ⊓ D)  (C ⊓ D)UND = CUND ∩ DUND  
3.4 Concept Understanding as a 
Product of Functional Roles 
How could we employ DLs in order to describe an 
understanding function as a [functional] role of a 
human being? Let me interpret functional roles 
(features) as the roles that are existentially functions, 
and, thus, they can express functional actions, 
movements, procedures and manners of human 
beings. Let NF be a set of functional roles and NR be 
the set of role [descriptions]. Obviously: NF ⊆ NR, 
and informally, functional roles are some kinds of 
roles.   
Lemma. The UND understanding model is–
semantically—structured over:  
a. the understanding domain (or DU), 
b. the understanding function (or -UND), and 
c. the set DUUND (or equivalently, the effect of the 
understanding function -UND on the Top 
concept) that represents understanding all 
atomic concepts (everything) in the 
understanding domain.  
Analysis. The UND understanding model associates 
with each atomic concept a subset of DUUND, and 
with each ordinary atomic role a binary relation over 
DUUND
 × DUUND. Note that any functional role can be 
recognised as a partial function. More specifically, 
considering F = f1 ○ ··· ○ fn (F is a chain of 
functional roles), the chain f1UND
 ○ ··· ○ fnUND 
represents the composition of n partial 
understanding functions. In fact, by employing 
UND, any fiUND—semantically—supports the 
[overall] functional role FUND. Note that for all i in 
(1,n), fi+1 produces the input of fi. Therefore, the 
understanding of fi+1 (the output of fi+1) provides the 
input of the understanding of fi. In particular, any 
concept description could be understood over the 
subsets of DUUND. This characteristic is very useful 
in making a strong linkage between the terms 
‘understanding’ and ‘chain of functional roles’. It 
supports my semantic model in scheming and 
describing "the understanding as the product of a 
chain of functional roles, where the functional roles 
are the partial understanding functions". You will 
see how it works. 
3.5 Humans’ Functional Roles through 
SOLO’s Levels 
According to (Biggs and Collis, 2014), the Structure 
of Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO) taxonomy 
is a proper model that can provide an organised 
framework for representing different levels of 
humans’ understandings. This model is concerned 
with various complexities of understanding on its 
different layers. According to SOLO and focusing 
on humans’ levels of knowledge with regard to a 
concept, we have: 
 Pre-structured knowledge. Here humans’ 
knowledge of a concept is pre-structured (and is 
the product of their pre-conceptions).  
 Uni-structured knowledge. Humans have a 
limited knowledge about a concept. They may 
know one or few isolated fact(s) about a 
concept.  
 Multi-structured knowledge. They are getting to 
know a few facts relevant for a concept, but 
they are still unable to link and relate them 
together.  
 Related Knowledge. They have started to move 
towards deeper levels of understanding of a 
concept. Here they are able to link different 
facts and to explain several conceptions of a 
concept.  
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 Extended Abstracts. This is the most 
complicated level. Humans are not only able to 
link lots of related conceptions [of a concept] 
together, but they can also link them to other 
specified and complicated conceptions. Now 
they are able to link multiple facts and 
explanations in order to produce more 
complicated extensions relevant for a concept.  
 
Obviously, the extended abstracts are the products of 
deeper comprehensions of related structures. Related 
structures are the products of deeper 
comprehensions of multi-structures. The multi-
structures are the products of deeper 
comprehensions of uni-structures, and the uni-
structures are the products of deeper 
comprehensions of pre-structures. Let me select a 
process (as a sample of humans’ functional roles) 
from any of the SOLO’s levels and formalise it. 
According to SOLO, creation (with regard to an 
understood concept) is an instance of ‘extended 
abstracts’, justification (with regard to an understood 
concept) is an instance of ‘related structures’, 
description (with regard to an understood concept) is 
an instance of ‘multi-structures’ and identification 
(with regard to an understood concept) is an instance 
of ‘uni-structures’. Therefore, Creation, 
Justification, Description and Identification are four 
processes which could be analysed as functions in 
the model. Any of these functions can support a 
functional role as a ‘partial understanding function’: 
  
i. Creation has interrelatedness with creatingOf 
that is a functional role and extends the humans’ 
mental abstracts. 
ii. Justification has interrelatedness with the 
functional role justifyingOf that relates the lower 
structures. 
iii. Description has correlation with the 
functional role describingOf that produces the multi-
structures. 
iv. Identification has correlation with the 
functional role identifyingOf that generates the uni-
structures. 
 
It shall be emphasised that identifyingOf, 
describingOf, justifyingOf and creatingOf are only 
four examples of functional roles within SOLO’s 
categories, and, in fact, the SOLO’s levels are not 
limited to these functions. For example, followingOf 
and namingOf are two other instances of uni-
structures, combiningOf and enumeratingOf are two 
other instances of multi-structures, analysingOf and 
arguingOf are two other instances of related 
structures, and formulatingOf and theorisingOf are 
two other instances of extended abstracts. 
As mentioned, the functional roles creatingOf, 
justifyingOf, describingOf and identifyingOf represent 
the equivalent roles of the creation, justification, 
description and identification functions respectively. 
Furthermore, these functions are the partial functions 
of the understanding function. Obviously, the 
understanding function (that is a process) could also 
be considered to be equivalent to a functional role 
like understandingOf. Employing the ‘role inclusion’ 
axiom we have: (1) creatingOf ⊑ understandingOf, 
(2) justifyingOf ⊑ understandingOf, (3) describingOf ⊑ 
understandingOf, and (4) identifyingOf ⊑ 
understandingOf. Equivalently: (1) creation ⊆ 
understanding, (2) justification ⊆ understanding, 
(3) description ⊆ understanding, and (4) 
identification ⊆ understanding.  
It shall be claimed that understandingOf—
conceptually and logically—supports ‘the 
understanding function based on the analysed 
understanding model (or UND)’. Similarly, we can 
define CRN, JSN, DSN and IDN as sub-models of 
UND for representing creation, justification, 
description and identification respectively. Any of 
these models can—semantically—satisfy the 
terminologies and world descriptions in Table 4. 
Accordingly—relying on inductive rules—they can 
satisfy concept descriptions in Table 5.  
Note that CRN (as a model) fulfils the desires of 
UND better (and more satisfying) than JSN, DSN 
and IDN. Considering DU as the understanding 
domain, we have:   
 
DUUND   ⊆   DU
CRN 
⊆ DU
JSN 
⊆ DU
DSN 
⊆ DU
IDN.  
 
More specifically: 
 
 DUCRN represents the model of creation over the 
understanding domain. It consists of concepts 
which are (or could be) ‘created’ by human 
beings. Formally: CCRN ∈ DUCRN. 
 DUJSN represents the model of justification over 
the understanding domain. It consists of 
concepts which are (or could be) ‘justified’ by 
human beings. Formally: CJSN ∈  DUJSN.              
 DUDSN represents the model of description over 
the understanding domain. It consists of 
concepts which are (or could be) ‘described’ by 
human beings. Formally: CDSN ∈ DUDSN. 
 DUIDN represents the model of Identification 
over the understanding domain. It consists of 
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concepts which are (or could be) ‘identified’ by 
human beings. Formally: CIDN ∈ DUIDN. 
Proposition. The terminological axioms and the 
world descriptions (in Table 4) and inductive 
concept descriptions (in Table 5) are all valid and 
meaningful for CRN, JSN, DSN and IDN. Therefore, 
inductive concept descriptions are also valid and 
meaningful over the concatenation of the creation, 
justification, description and identification functions 
that have supported these terminological models.  
Proposition. All satisfactions based on IDN are 
already satisfied by DSN, JSN and CRN over DUDSN, 
DUJSN and DUCRN respectively. Informally, if a human 
being is able to describe, justify and create with 
regard to her/his conception of a concept, so, she/he 
is already capable of identifying that concept. 
Furthermore, she/he might be able to identify 
something else with regard to her/his conception of 
that concept.  
Formal Analysis. The semantics of the composite 
function ‘creation (justification (description 
(identification (C))))’—that is the product of the 
chain of functional roles—supports the proposed 
semantic model on DUUND, which is the central 
domain of the understanding (central part of the 
understanding domain). Considering all the roles 
relevant for the concept C, we have: 
1.  (∀R1.C)CRN
  =  
{ a ∈ DUCRN 
  |  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R1CRN
 →   b ∈ C CRN }.   
 
Therefore: 
 
2. (∀R2.C)JSN
  =  
{ a ∈ DJSN  |  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R2 JSN
  →  b ∈ C JSN }.   
 
Therefore: 
 
3. (∀R3.C)DSN
  =  
{ a ∈ DU DSN
  |  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R3 DSN
  →  b ∈ C DSN }.   
 
Therefore: 
 
4. (∀R4.C)IDN
  =  
{ a ∈ DU IDN
  |  ∀b.(a,b) ∈ R4 IDN
  →   b ∈ C IDN }. 
 
In the afore-itemised formalism R1, R2, R3 and R4 
stand for creatingOf, justifyingOf, describingOf and 
identifyingOf respectively. Consequently, CRN, JSN, 
DSN and IDN have been observed as roles of human 
beings. Accordingly, it’s possible to represent the 
chain of functional roles in the form of a collection 
of implications as following:  
 
(∀R1.C) CRN
  ⇒  (∀R2.C) JSN
  ⇒  (∀R3.C) DSN
  ⇒  
(∀R4.C) IDN. 
It must be concluded that ‘any role based on a 
conception of C’ to the left of any of arrows makes a 
logical premise for ‘other roles based on conceptions 
of C’ to the right of that arrow. It shall be stressed 
that this is a very important terminological fact. The 
concluded logical relationship represents a flow of 
concept understanding from deeper layers to 
shallower layers.  
4 AN ONTOLOGY FOR 
CONCEPT UNDERSTANDING 
According to (Grimm et al., 2007; Staab and Studer, 
2009), an ontology—from the philosophical point of 
view—is described as studying the science of being 
and existence. Ontologies must be capable of 
demonstrating the structure of the reality of a 
thing/phenomenon. They check multiple attributes, 
particularities and properties that belong to a 
thing/phenomenon because of its natural and 
structural existence. An ontology—from another 
perspective and through the lenses of information 
and computer sciences—is described as an explicit 
and formal specification of a shared 
conceptualisation in a domain of interest. However, 
in my opinion, there could be very strong 
relationship between these two descriptions of 
ontologies. In fact, ontologies in information 
sciences attempt to mirror the things’/phenomena’s 
structures in virtual and artificial systems. The 
ontological descriptions in information sciences 
tackle to provide appropriate logical and formal 
descriptions of a phenomenon [and of its structure] 
considering various concepts relevant for that 
phenomenon. From this perspective, an ontology can 
be schemed and demonstrated by semantic networks 
and semantic representations. A semantic network is 
a graph whose nodes represent concepts (e.g., unary 
predicates) and whose arcs represent relations (e.g., 
binary/n-ary predicates) between the concepts. 
Accordingly, semantic networks provide structural 
representations of a thing/phenomenon. In Figure 1 I 
have designed a semantic network as an ontology for 
‘concept understanding’. This hierarchical semantic 
representation, (1) specifies the conceptual 
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relationships between the most important ingredients 
of this research, (2) demonstrates the logical 
representation of concept understanding. It shows 
how the proposed model attempts to represent 
concept understanding. This semantic representation 
can be interpreted as a specification of the shared 
conceptualisation of concept understanding within 
terminological systems. The proposed ontology can 
be reformulated and formalised in ALC in the form 
of a collection of fundamental terminologies as 
following: 
A Formal Ontology for Concept Understanding.  
{  UnaryPredicate ⊑ Predicate, BinaryPredicate ⊑ 
Predicate, Concept ⊑ UnaryPredicate, Concept ⊑ 
∃hasInstance.Individual, BinaryPredicate ⊑  
(∃hasNode.Individual ⊓ ∃hasNode.Individual), Role 
⊑ BinaryPredicate, Relation ⊑ BinaryPredicate, 
Function ⊑ Relation , Interpretation ⊑ Function, 
Conceptualisation ⊑ Function, ConceptUnderstanding 
⊑ Interpretation, ConceptUnderstanding ⊑ 
Conceptualisation, PartialFunction ⊑ Function, 
FunctionalRole ⊑ Role, FunctionalRole ⊑ 
hasEquivalence.PartialFunction, FunctionalRole ⊑ 
Function, SubModel ⊑ Model, SemanticModel ⊑ 
Model, InterpretationSemanticModel ⊑ 
SemanticModel, UnderstandingSemanticModel ⊑ 
SemanticModel, UnderstandingSemanticSubModel ⊑ 
SubModel, UnderstandingSemanticSubModel ⊑ 
SemanticModel, InterpretationSemanticModel ⊑ 
∃hasSupport.Interpretation, 
UnderstandingSemanticModel ⊑ 
∃hasSupport.InterpretationSemanticModel, 
UnderstandingSemanticModel ⊑ 
∃hasSupport.UnderstandingSemanticSubModel,   
UnderstandingSemanticSubModel ⊑ 
∃hasSupport.FunctionalRole } 
 
 
Figure 1: An Ontology for Concept Understanding. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The readers of this article may ask “if the term 
‘understanding’ in this research is related to the real 
human beings, or if this research’s domain is only 
information and computer sciences?” Actually, 
that’s why I have employed Description Logics. 
Under a plethora of names (among them 
terminological systems and Concept Languages), 
Description Logics (DLs) attempt to provide 
descriptive knowledge representation formalisms 
based on formal semantics to establish common 
[conceptual and logical] grounds and 
interrelationships between human beings and 
machines. Description Logics supported me in 
revealing some hidden conceptual assumptions that 
could support me in having a better understanding of 
‘concept understanding’. DLs—by considering 
concepts as unary predicates and by applying 
terminological interpretations over them—have 
proposed a realisable logical description for 
explaining the humans’ concept understanding. The 
central contribution of the article has been providing 
a formal semantics for logical analysis of concept 
understanding. According to the logical analysis, a 
background for terminological representation of 
concept understanding has been expressed. 
Consequently, a semantic representation [as an 
ontology and a specification of the shared 
conceptualisation of ‘concept understanding’] has 
been designed and formalised.  
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